Desert Retribution And Torture

In general, there are two ways in which punishment is justified. Forward-looking justifications look to the good results that punishment brings about and that therefore occur after it. These results include the wrongdoer being deterred, incapacitated, or improved, as well as the deterrence of would-be wrongdoers, a decrease in costs associated with crime prevention, less fear in the community, and the promotion of hatred and disgust for actions that victimize others. In contrast, backward-looking justifications look to events that occurred before the punishment. On this approach, punishment is not justified via the good results that it brings about. The dominant backward-looking justification is retributivism. According to it, the wrongdoer in virtue of his past act deserves punishment and this desert justifies punishment. This book is an in-depth defense of retributivism. Since punitive desert lies at the heart of retributivism, it is important to provide an analysis of it. This is the focus of the first part of the book. I argue that punitive desert has to do with punishment being an intrinsically valuable event, where its value results from its standing in a certain relation to a person's having culpably performed a wrongdoing. I argue that this type of desert does not by itself contain moral duties to act in any way. In particular, it does not impose on someone the duty to punish a wrongdoer. This results in retributivism being more complex than the traditional accounts, since it must therefore involve duties that refer to but are not constituted by punitive desert. I also argue that punitive desert is independent of the wrongdoer's moral character and instead rests solely on a person's acts. Lastly, I argue that the value of punitive desert cannot be accounted for via more fundamental moral considerations. This results in punitive desert being a rather primitive moral notion in that it is not justified via more fundamental moral values. Like other intrinsically good things, e.g. friendship, and other intrinsically bad things, e.g. promise-breaking, punitive desert can be used to explain why certain states of affairs are both good and right.--Adapted from introduction.