Dynamic Resource Allocation In Team Contests With Imperfectly Discriminatory Elimination

We study a class of multi-stage imperfectly discriminatory team contests with Blotto budgets and complete information. We fully characterize the pure strategy Nash equilibrium for this class of contests under certain basic assumptions, and show that in the two-stage case, there will be a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium, the effect of not very strong intra-group endowment differences will be completely erased, and the contest will show a strong ``intra-team fairness'' property. When the contest is extended to three or more stages, there will be still a unique symmetric equilibrium, but will also exist a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. The equilibrium outcome under the 3+ stage setting still maintains ``the generalized intra-group fairness'' property, which means that the combat units in the same superior combat unit in the previous stage, will invest the same resources in this stage.