Nuclear Command Control And Communications Nc3 In Asia Pacific

Currently, there are no international standards or norms that are specific to NC3 operations—the sole exception being the clause in US-Soviet/Russian nuclear arms treaties that proscribes interference with national technical means, which is an integral part of NC3. Of course, all international humanitarian laws and related treaties that apply in general to the use of nuclear weapons apply to NC3 personnel, military and civilian. Whether NC3 operations in the nine nuclear weapons states are sufficiently rigorous, robust, and secure to ensure that nuclear weapons will not be used except in extremis— defined by the International Court of Justice’s 1996 ruling on the legality of nuclear weapons was when the existence of the state itself is threatened—is doubtful. There is some evidence that at least lip service is paid to how international law shapes nuclear use options in the various elements that constitute NC3 including all instructions, orders, guidance, training, domestic laws, and the overall design of the NC3 architecture to ensure negative controls and avoid mistaken nuclear strikes. The standard for operating NC3 that is consistent with international law may be so high as impossible to achieve, in which case systematic tests against the legal criteria, similar to those conducted to ascertain the reliability with which nuclear weapons can be delivered, would rule out deployment.