Rethinking Tradition As Revelation In Islam

Judgement in religion is the prerogative of Allah. To derive prohibitions from traditions is tantamount to treating the transmitters of traditions as "judges." Furthermore, treating tradition as a "judge" of revelation subordinates revelation to tradition. Those who judge by what Allah did not reveal are treated in the Book of Allah as kafirun (disbelievers), zalimun (wrongdoers) and fasiqun (rebels). The purpose of the sharia is to ensure equity. Just laws protect persons and the wellbeing of society. Unjust laws harm people and undermine the well-being of the community. The turn from revelation to tradition reoriented the umma from Allah to the prophet, from the Book of Allah to the books of traditions, and from ethics to aesthetics. The beauty of recitation is prioritized at the expense of the understanding of the meaning of revelation. The turn from revelation to tradition detached jurisprudence from its moorings in tauhid. The treatment of tradition as revelation produced troubling effects. It fused tradition with revelation. In a few cases, man-made rulings replaced revealed rulings. Tradition replaced revelation as preeminent root of the sharia. In a few instances, rulings from traditions replaced revealed rulings. Rulings in defiance of revelation from traditions were embedded in penal law. This transpired in cases of the punishments for apostasy, blasphemy, and adultery. Mandating capital punishment for these acts transgressed the limits (hudud) of Allah. The treatment of tradition as revelation "equal" to the Book of Allah spawned legislation based on tradition, parallel to legislation based on revelation. Thus, rulings of traditional jurisprudence based on the premise that tradition provides a foundation for legislation require being reviewed. In different words, traditional exegesis and jurisprudence require reconstruction, to bring them in line with revelation. This requires treating revelation as the exclusive foundation of legislation in the sharia. Refraining from the utilization of reason restricts the power of a person to act rationally. This takes him or her from the ranks of the mukallafuna, responsible persons in possession of their faculties. The failure to use reason renders traditional exegesis and jurisprudence unreliable. This requires attention. The treatment of the hadiths as revelation "equal" to the Book of Allah suggests two roots of the law. But Allah prohibited "adding" to revelation. The prophet also prohibited the recording of traditions. A few persons recorded the prophetic traditions regardless. These reports would be treated as a root of the law. Prohibiting the use of reason to understand the Book of Allah made access to revelation harder. The characterisation of the use of reason in the understanding of revelation as kufr discouraged the ulema from using reason. As a result, the religious sciences, particularly exegesis and jurisprudence, atrophied. This underlines the need to reconstruct religious thought.