Three Essays On Institutional Investors And Income Taxes

This dissertation investigates the role of institutional investors in capital market tax studies. Specifically, this studies examines how institutional investors influence firms' cost of capital and financing decisions following changes in personal tax rates on debt and equity income. The dissertation is organized into three essays that examine these topics. The first two essays examine tax rate changes in 1997 and 2003 that reduced the personal tax rates on interest, capital gains and dividends. Essay 3 summarizes relevant literature involving institutional investors and capital market tax studies. Essay 1 investigates whether differences between the tax liabilities of the underlying shareholders of institutional investors affect firms' capital structures and decisions to issue debt versus equity following changes in tax rates on investment income received by individuals. The study predicts that firms with high concentrations of tax disadvantaged institutional investors (institutions whose underlying shareholders are taxable) will issue more equity relative to debt than those with high concentrations of tax-advantaged institutional investors (institutions whose underlying shareholders are not taxable). The results find that the financing decisions of firms with high levels of tax-disadvantaged institutional investors are influenced by changes in individual tax rates. Essay 2 investigates whether differences in the tax attributes of the underlying shareholders of institutional investors influences the impact of equity tax rate changes on a firm's cost of equity. The study examines a sample period of two years (eight quarters) around the enactment of the 1997 and 2003 Acts. The study finds that firms with high levels of tax-disadvantaged ownership experienced a decrease in their cost of equity capital following a decrease in the individual tax rate on capital gains. In addition, the interaction of the institutional investor dummy variable and a dummy variable indicating the observation is after the 2003 Act indicates that the cost of equity capital for firms with high levels of tax-disadvantaged ownership decreased following the 2003 Act. The results of Essays 1 and 2 provide evidence that institutional investors are not homogeneous with respect to their influence on firms' cost of capital and financing decisions following changes in individual tax rates.