Essays On The Dynamics Of The Labor Market

This dissertation explores the business cycle dynamics of the aggregate labor market. In two essays I advance the theoretical modelling of these markets and examine whether the new theory does quantitatively better at accounting for empirical evidence than existing models. Both essays examine models where market incompleteness faced by workers implies that long term wage contracts play a role in providing consumption smoothing to workers. The terms of these state contingent contracts depend on: (1) the preferences of the contracting parties, (2) whether parties can commit to contracts. The essays embed such optimal dynamic contracting problems into a Mortensen-Pissarides style model of labor market flows with aggregate shocks, contributing to the theoretical modelling of wage determination in this model framework. I find that market incompleteness has quantitatively only limited ability to explain the volatility puzzle facing existing models: unemployment varies strongly over the business cycle, while labor productivity varies much less. Whether the models are consistent with wage data hinges both on the preferences of contracting parties: entrepreneurs versus workers, as well as constraints on contracting.