Reputations in Repeated Games, Second Version
Language: en
Pages: 88
Authors: George J. Mailath
Categories:
Type: BOOK - Published: 2013 - Publisher:

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This paper, prepared for the Handbook of Game Theory, volume 4 (Peyton Young and Shmuel Zamir, editors, Elsevier Press), surveys work on reputations in repeated
Repeated Games and Reputations
Language: en
Pages: 664
Authors: George J. Mailath
Categories: Business & Economics
Type: BOOK - Published: 2006-09-28 - Publisher: Oxford University Press

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Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make
Repeated Games and Reputations
Language: en
Pages: 664
Authors: George J. Mailath
Categories: Business & Economics
Type: BOOK - Published: 2006-09-28 - Publisher: Oxford University Press

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Personalized and continuing relationships play a central role in any society. Economists have built upon the theories of repeated games and reputations to make
Reputation and Punishment in Repeated Games with Two Long Run Players
Language: en
Pages: 25
Authors: Robert Evans
Categories:
Type: BOOK - Published: 1995 - Publisher:

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Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships, Second Version
Language: en
Pages: 0
Authors: Martin Cripps
Categories:
Type: BOOK - Published: 2004 - Publisher:

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For games of public reputation with uncertainty over types and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) showed that an informed player